Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are important tools for infortation systems security. However, they generate a large number of alerts which complicate the task of network administrator to understand these triggered alerts and take appropriate actions. In this paper, we present a logic-based approach to alert correlation. This logic allows to integrate administrator's preferences and knowledge. Our logic, called Extended Qualitative Choice
INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an active area of research for almost thirteen years (Anderson, 1980) . Actually, there are two main intrusion detection approaches used to detect attacks on the network. Anomaly detection (Lunt, 1990) , (Porras and Neumann, 1997 ) is based on defining a profile representing normal activities. Any action or behavior that deviates from the normal profile is considered as anomaly or possible intrusion. This approach has the advantage of being able to detect unknown attacks. However, it generates a large volume of false alerts. Misuse detection (Kumar and Spafford, 1995) , (Paxson, 1999) focuses on the characteristics or signatures of known attacks that exploit weaknesses in system and application software. They have the advantage that they achieve very high detection rates on known attacks. However, they are not able to detect new attacks that do not follow predefined patterns. Clearly, whatever the used approach, an administrator is confronted with a large amount of alerts produced by IDS. In this context, several alert correlation approaches have been proposed in recent years to address this problem. Alert correlation tools are important for reducing the large volume of alerts that are generated by IDSs. Generally, they can be classified into three categories: approaches based on similarity between alert attributes (Valdes and Skinner, 2001) , (Julisch, 2003) , alert correlation based on known attacks scenarios (Eckmann et al., 2000) , (Morin et al., 2002) and approaches that are based on prerequisites and consequences relationship (Cuppens and Miège, 2002) , (Ning et al., 2002) . Even if existing alerts correlation approaches are quite efficient to remove redundant information or to detect complex coordinated attacks, they still produce a large number of alerts. Moreover to the best of our knowledge, none of existing alert correlation tools take into account administrator preferences and knowledge. The alert correlation proposed in this paper follows another direction of the current correlation techniques. It is also complementary to existing alert correlation approaches. It consists in modeling administrator knowledge (on system, network, IDS) and his preferences. The main idea is to develop a logic that ranks-order alerts and classifies them in different categories that fit more or less administrator knowledge or preferences. Alerts in the first category are those that should be first presented to administrator. And if needed alerts of the second category will be presented, and so on. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our new logic and Section 3 presents our alert correlation approach. Section 4 concludes the paper.
A NEW LOGIC FOR HANDLING PREFERENCES
We present our new logic to be used to represent administrator preferences. The starting point is an existing logic called Qualitative Choice Logic (QCL) (Brewka et al., 2004) . It is an extension of propositional logic. The non-standard part of QCL logic is a new logical connective ×, called ordered disjunction.
Intuitively, if A and B are propositional formulas then A × B means: "if possible A, but if A is impossible then at least B". QCL logic can be very useful for representing preferences. However, its inference relation is less satisfactory. This is due on the one hand to the way rules are handled, where ordered disjunction is lost when preferences are associated with negation (see (Benferhat and Sedki, 2007) for more details).
On the other hand propositional logic is not appropriate to express complex knowledge. It cannot express generic knowledge that involve variables. The extensions of QCL proposed in (Benferhat and Sedki, 2007) are not satisfactory for our application, in particular they are defined within propositional language. What is needed is a richer language to express general pieces of information. This is the aim of the following subsections.
EQ C L Language
EQ C L language is composed of three encapsulated sub-languages: Propositional Logic Language, the set of Basic Choice Formulas (BCF) and the set of General Choice Formulas (GCF).
1. Basic Choice Formulas (BCF): Let PS denotes a set of propositional symbols and PROP PS denotes the set of propositional formulas. BCF formulas are ordered disjunctions of propositional formulas. The language composed of BCF formulas is denoted by BCF PS , is defined as follow:
c) Every basic choice formula is only obtained by applying the two rules above a finite number of times.
2. General Choice Formulas (GCF): GCF formulas represent any formula that can be obtained from PS using connectors ×, ∧, ∨, ¬. The language composed of GCF formulas, denoted by GCF PS , is defined inductively as follows:
(c) The language of GCF PS is only obtained by applying the two rules above a finite number of times.
Example 1. The formula "Bro-Alerts × SnortAlerts" is a BCF formula, while the formula "(Bu f f erover f low-Alerts × Ping-Alerts) ∧ (ScanAlerts × Badtra f f ic-Alerts)" is a GCF formula.
Inference Relation of Basic Choice Formulas
The semantics of EQ C L formulas is based on the degree of satisfaction of a formula in a particular model I. An interpretation I is an assignment of the classical truth values T,F to the atoms in PS. Inference relation of BCF formulas is given in the following definition:
.. ∨ a n and k = min{j |I |= a j }. 2. Let φ ∈ PROP PS . I |= 1 φ iff I |= φ.
Normalization Form and Inference from General Choice Formulas
This section proposes our inference relation for GCF formulas which departs from (and overcomes limitations of) the one defined in (Brewka et al., 2004) . Inference relation of GCF simply reuses Definition 1 after a normalization step which transforms a GCF formula into a BCF formula. Namely, first, an equivalent BCF formula of each GCF formula is provided, and then Definition 1 applied. The following introduces the notion of normal form function denoted by N EQ C L which associates with each GCF formulas (complex form of preferences), its corresponding BCF formulas (simple form of preferences).
Definition 2. We define a normal function denoted by N EQ C L , a function from GCF PS → BCF PS , such that:
1. Normal form of basic choice formulas and propositional formulas are these formulas themselves:
The normal form with respect to negated formulas: ∀ φ ∈ GCF PS , and
The normal form is decomposable with respect to conjunction, disjunction and ordered disjunction of GCF formulas:
4. Normal form of negated, conjunction and disjunction of BCF formulas are: Let φ = a 1 ×a 2 × . . . ×a n , and ψ = b 1 ×b 2 × . . . ×b m such that a i 's and b i 's are propositional formulas,
where k = max(m, n), and
, and
Example 2. Assume that the network administrator wants to analyze R2L alerts that are preferred to Probe ones and also U2R alerts that are preferred to Dos ones. These preferences are represented by the following GCF formula ψ = (R2L-Alerts × ProbeAlerts) ∧ (U2R-Alerts × DoS-Alerts). To give the satisfaction degree with respect to a given model of ψ, we first normalize the formula ψ (namely, we transform ψ in the equivalent BCF formula) as indicated in Definition 2, then we use Definition 1 to give the inference relation of obtained BCF formula. 1. Normalization of ψ: Using item 4-(a) of Definition 2, we obtain:
2. Satisfaction degree of ψ:
-Let I 1 ={Probe-alerts, DoS-Alerts}. Using item 2 of Definition 1, we have I 1 |=R2L-Alerts∧U2R-Alerts, I 1 |=R2L-Alerts∧DoS-Alerts, I 1 |=Probe-Alerts∧U2R-Alerts, and I 1 |=Probe-Alerts∧DoS-Alerts, so I 1 |= (R2L-Alerts ∧ DoS-Alerts)∨(Probe-Alerts ∧ DoS-Alerts)∨(ProbeAlerts ∧ U2R-Alerts). Using item 1 of Definition 1, we have I 1 |= 2 N EQ C L (ψ). We conclude that I 1 satisfies ψ to degree 2.
-If I 2 ={DoS-Alerts}, then I 2 |=N EQ C L (ψ). I 2 does not satisfy ψ. -If I 3 ={R2L-Alerts, U2R-Alerts}, then I 3 |= 1 N EQ C L (ψ). We conclude that I 3 satisfies ψ to degree 1. Namely, ψ is fully satisfactory in I 3 .
The following defines preferred models when we have a set of knowledge and a set of preference. Let K be a set of propositional formulas which represents knowledge, and let T be a set of preferences that contains only simple form preferences (BCF formulas). We suppose that all complex form preferences (GCF formulas) are first transformed into simple form preferences, using Definition 2. Definition 3. Let M k (T ) denote the subset of basic choice formulas of T satisfied by a model M to a degree k (using Definition 1).
1. M is model of K, 2. M is maximally {K ∪ T }-preferred.
Universally Quantified First Order

EQ C L
Propositional logic is not appropriate to express complex knowledge. It can only deal with pieces of information regarding particular situations or properties, and cannot express knowledge that involve variables. So, what is needed is a richer language to express general information. In the following, we slightly extend our logic to a fragment of universally quantified first order formulas that do not involve function symbols. For the purpose of our application there is no need to consider the full first order logic. More precisely, let X = {x, y, z, ...} be a set of variables. Let C = {c 1 , c 2 ,...,c n } be a set of constants. We define a term as either a constant of C or a variable of X . Let us denote by P = {p, q, r, ...} a set of predicate symbols.
The following defines the notion of unquantified first order EQ C L formulas: Definition 4. Unquantified first order EQ C L formulas are defined as follows:
1. If p is a predicate symbol of arity n, and t 1 ,...,t n are terms, then p(t 1 ,...,t n ) is an unquantified first order EQ C L formula. 2. If φ and ψ are two unquantified first order EQ C L formulas, then φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, ¬φ, φ ×ψ are unquantified first order EQ C L formulas.
In this paper, for sake of simplicity, we only restrict ourselves to universally quantified first order EQ C L formulas given by the following definition:
Definition 5. Universally quantified first order EQ C L formulas are obtained by:
• If φ is an unquantified first order QCL formula, and {x 1 ,..., x n } are the set of variables used in φ, then ∀ x 1 ,..., ∀ x n φ is a universally quantified first order EQ C L formula.
Example 3. Assume that the network administrator prefers alerts that are issued by Bro IDS to those issued by Snort IDS. We use the universally quantified EQ C L formula ψ to define this preference: ψ = ∀x, ∀y Alert-Bro(x) ×Alert-snort(y).
Universally quantified first order EQ C L language offers flexibility for expressing knowledge and preferences. However, from reasoning point of view, it is better to work on propositional level in order to exploit existing inference tools. Namely, it is important to instantiate first order knowledge's bases to propositional ones. The instantiation steps are: 1. Let K and T be two sets of universally quantified first order EQ C L formulas, where K does not involve the ordered disjunction symbol ×.
2. Let E(K,T ) be the set of constant symbols used in K and T . 3. Let ψ = ∀ x 1 ,..., ∀ x n φ be a universally quantified first order EQ C L formula. Define D(ψ) as the domain associated with ψ. D(ψ) is a subset of E(K,T ) n composed of feasible n-uplets of E(K,T ) n . It is either set by an expert, or initialized by default to E(K,T ) n . 4. Define I nstantiation(ψ) as the set of all grounded EQ C L formulas obtained by replacing (x 1 ,..., x n ) in ψ respectively by an element (c 1 ,..., c n ) of D(ψ). 5. Define I nst(K) (resp. I nst(T )) as the result of instantiating each formula of K (resp. of T ).
The inference relation for EQ C L formulas is given by the following steps: * Apply Definition 2 to transform universally quantified first order GCF formulas into universally quantified first order BCF formulas. * Apply the instantiation steps for each formula as indicated above for K and T . * Apply Definition 1 (item 1) for all obtained BCF formulas or (item 2) for propositional ones. * Compute preferred models of { K ∪ T } using Definition 3.
APPLICATION OF EQ C L TO ALERT CORRELATION
Description of Inputs
The inputs of our model are: Example 4. Assume that G contains one alert identified by id1. Assume that the attributes concerning this alert are: IDS identity is Snort, the used protocol is TCP and the class of attack is DoS. These facts will be represented by K 1 = {IDS(id1, Snort), Protocol(id1, TCP), Class(id1, DoS)}. Note that in general, some attributes may not be informed (known) by an IDS.
Types of Facts:
We distinguish two kinds of facts:
(a) Alerts Facts: These facts are directly defined on basic attributes of alerts. Protocol(A 1 , TCP) is an example of alert fact which indicates that the attribute protocol of alert A 1 is TCP. (b) Other Facts: These facts concern attributes that are not known by the IDS from which the alerts are issued. Direction of alert is an example of this kind of facts. It is based on source and target IP addresses. These information allow to know the direction of concerned alerts on the system (inbound, outbound, inside).
2. Knowledge of the Network Administrator: Administrator network can provide some knowledge or beliefs on networks, on system, etc. This knowledge base is denoted by K 2 , it contains a set of universally quantified propositional formulas (namely, formulas that do not involve ×).
Preferences of the Network Administrator:
The network administrator can express his preferences according to what he wants to first analyze and what he would like to ignore. This will be represented with a set of EQ C L formulas T .
Output of our Model
The output of our model is a subset G ⊆ G. More precisely, the subset of alerts in G to be first presented to the network administrator. The objective of our alert correlation, is to first present only alerts that satisfy knowledge and preferences of the network administrator, namely, we only present preferred alerts. Then if needed second preferred alerts will be presented, etc. So, we need to preprocess available alerts and encode them in our logical framework. Namely, we need to: -Extract the set of facts K 1 from the given alerts. -Represent each preference of the administrator as a universally quantified first order EQ C L formula.
This will be represented by T .
-Represent each knowledge of the administrator as a universally quantified propositional formula. This will be represented by K 2 . Then, -Use N EQ C L to normalize the GCF formulas.
-Apply the steps of instantiation according to the all
-Select only instantiated formulas that concern considered facts.
-Provide the inference relation (satisfaction degree) of the instantiated formulas.
-Determine preferred models. Finally, -Define G as a set of alerts which are true in preferred models.
A Detailed Example
Assume that the input is a set of alerts given in Table  1 . This input contains 6 alerts given by Snort IDS on some traffic data. Note that in general, some attributes may not be informed by the IDS. For instance, Snort does not provide the attribute Direction (which is derived). Because of the important number of alerts and presence of false alerts, it is not useful to analyze all alerts. So, we assume that, a network administrator provides the following set of knowledge and preferences to select and choose preferred ones:
1. Administrator's Preferences:
-The network administrator prefers alerts which are identified with TCP protocol than alerts identified with UDP protocol than those identified with ICMP protocol. Namely, if x, y, z are three alerts, and if the protocol of x (resp. y, z) is TCP (resp. UDP, ICMP), then it is preferred to first present x, then y and lastly z.
-He prefers inbound alerts than outbound ones.
2. Administrator's Knowledge: -He wants to ignore all ICMP alerts.
-He wants to ignore redundant alerts.
The predicate symbols of our language are associated with alerts attributes Timestamp, Sid, Portdst,..., and: * Di f f er(A i , A j ) which means that alerts A i and A j have different identities. * Present-alert(id) when it is true, means that the alert should be presented to the administrator.
1. Extract the Fact Base K 1 : -Alert facts are directly extracted from the given alerts (see Table 1 ). We only specify facts that are relevant to knowledge and preferences of the network administrator:
2. Formalize the Preferences Base T : Administrator's preferences given above are formalized respectively by φ 1 and φ 2 as follows:
4. Define I nst(T ) and I nst(K 2 ): To compute I nst(T ) and I nst(K 2 ), a direct way is to consider all different possibilities regarding different values of alert identities. For instance, for φ 1 , we need to consider all pairs (x, y, z) from
However, with the help of K 1 , some instantiations are simply impossible. For instance, in φ 1 , there is no need to consider (A 1 , A 4 , A 5 ) since this will lead:
Since together with Protocol(A 1 , ICMP) ∈ K 2 , this rule will never be applied, and can be removed. Given this observation, I nst(K 2 ) and I nst(T ) are given in the following:
To compute the set of preferred models of {K 2 ∪ T }, namely to give preferred alerts, we provide the satisfaction degree of all formulas in I nst(K 2 ) and I nst(T ), namely formulas ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 , ψ 4 , ψ 5 , ψ 6 , ψ 7 , ψ 8 , ψ 9 , ψ 10 , ψ 11 , ψ 12 , ψ 13 for each interpretation. For lack of space, we do not give the table of preferred models. One can check that all preferred models contain {Present-alert(A 1 ), Present-alert(A 6 )}. Hence G' = {A 1 , A 6 } and this will be first presented to the administrator. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented our alert correlation approach which follows another direction of existing correlation techniques. It is complementary to existing alert correlation approaches. It consists in modeling administrator knowledge (on system, network, IDS) and its preferences in order to classify alerts, discard information that are less important and present alerts that fit administrator preferences. A future work is to enrich knowledge bases and preferences in our experimental studies. A first experimental study on real network traffic shows that reduction of more than 60 % of generated alerts can be performed.
